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1. INTRODUCTION 
Some philosophers have held that time travel of  a certain type is logically 
impossible. The type of  time travel in question is crudely exemplified by 
the following: the Time Traveller gets into his time machine, throws some 
switches, and is transported through time back to the time of  the French 
Revolution. This variety of  time travel was the basis of  H. G. Wells' 
well-known and very popular  novel The Time Machine, so I will call it 
'Wellsian time travel'. Philosophers have given many different arguments 
for the logical impossibility of  Wellsian time travel, some of  them depen- 
dent on what these philosophers take to be the nature of  time and others 
dependent on such things as the criteria of  identity for persons. 
In this paper I want to develop a theory or a model of  time which will 
handle at least some of the objections often raised to Wellsian time travel. 
This model is a passage model of  time, that is, a model which allows 
motion through time. I will discuss the chief competitor of  the passage 
theory - the so-called manifold theory - in Section 3. After stating the 
objections to Wellsian time travel and my reply to them in the form of my 
model of  time, I will make some comments on the nature and purpose of  
such speculations about time, the possibility of  changing the past, and 
the alleged paradoxical situations that are often said to be made possible 
by time travel. 
2. THE WILLIAMS OBJECTION 
The first argument I wish to consider against the logicM possibility of  
Wellsian time travel is well-expressed by Donald Williams: 
Time travel, prima facie, then, is analyzable either as the banality that at each different 
moment we occupy a different moment from the one we occupied before, or the con- 
tradiction that at each different moment we occupy a different moment from the one 
which we are then occupying - that five minutes from now, for example, I may be one 
hundred years from now. I 
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To back up his view that Wellsian time travel is thought of (at least by 
Wells himself) in this allegedly contradictory way, Williams quotes from 
Wells' novel: 
He may even now - if I may use the phrase - be wandering on some plesiosaurus- 
haunted oolitic coral reef, or beside the lonely saline seas of the Triassic Age# 
Williams' point seems to be that the Time Traveller would have two 
different temporal designations truly applicable to him at one time. We 
can say that, for example, now he is one hundred years in the past. And 
Williams would interpret our saying tiffs as saying that the Time Traveller 
is "a t"  the moment designated by 'now' and simultaneously "a t "  the 
moment designated by 'one hundred years in the past'. But a person cart 
be "a t "  only one moment at one time. Hence, such statements as the above 
express logical impossibilities. But such statements are sanctioned by 
Wellsian time travel. Hence Wellsian time travel is logically impossible. 
3. A N  ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNT OF PUTATIVE TIME TRAVEL 
Williams would presumably not deny that we might have some odd cases 
which give the appearance of being cases of Wellsian time travel. He does 
not discuss these cases, but it is abundantly clear from his article how 
he would handle them. Let us take, as an example of such an odd case, the 
following: the Time Traveller throws the switches on his machine at 2 PM 
and thereupon disappears from the laboratory (machine and all); at 
6 PM he suddenly materializes in the laboratory, expressing relief that he 
had gotten back from the past in time for dinner. It would be natural for 
us to say that between 2 PM and 6 PM he was in the past and that, for 
example, at 4 PM he was one hundred years in the past (thus making a 
statement which Williams regards as expressing a logical impossibility). 
Now, since Williams denies that this case is to be construed as a ease 
of Wellsian time travel, how would he construe it? Consider the follow- 
ing diagram: 
t i m e  l i n e - -  
A B C D E  
I .... I I I I  . . . .  
I l" I I l,t-time line 
1851 1894 1900 1923 1972 
Fig. 1. 
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The continuous lower line is the time line, while the lines above the time 
line represent the span of temporal existence of the Time Traveller (or, 
as we should now say, the Alleged Time Traveller). At point A the individ- 
ua~ begins to exist. This individual is indistinguishable from one who is, 
say, 50 years old. He is not born; he instead begins to exist with all of  the 
characteristics of  a 50-year-old man. Among his characteristics at A are 
what Wellsians would call "memories of  his existence between points C 
and D".  This individual goes out of  existence at point B and comes back 
into existence at C with all of  the characteristics of a new-born infant 
(and, of  course, with no memories of  the period A-B at all). He then goes 
out of  existence at 2 PM today (point D) and comes back into existence at 
6 PM (point E) with what both Wellsians and Williams can call "memories 
of both A-B and C-D". Moreover, his memories are such that his experi- 
ences during A-B seem later to him than those during C-D. But Williams 
would say that this last was an illusion and that in fact his experiences 
dm'ing C-D are later than those during A-B. The important point about 
this Williams-type explanation of this case is that our putative Time 
Traveller does not exist at all between 2 PM and 6 PM today. Hence, on 
this model of  the case, the Time Traveller does not exist at both 4 PM 
today and at 1872 (one hundred years in the past). Thus, this model avoids 
the alleged logical im possibility countenanced by the Wellsian model. 
It should be clear t,) the reader that Williams-type explanations of  these 
cases are based on a theory of  time which does not allow backward move- 
ment in time. Williams' own theory actually goes farther than this: he 
allows no movement in time whatsoever, forward or backward. For  him 
(and for many other philosophers), individuals are spatio-temporal cylin- 
ders; what exists at a moment of  time is not the individual himself but 
instead a 'temporal part '  of  that individual. The individual, then, is the 
'sum' of  his temporal parts. As Williams puts it, "And each of  us proceeds 
through time only as a fence proceeds across a farm: that is, parts of our 
being, and the fence's, occupy successive instants and points, respec- 
tively". 3 Passage through time is nothing more than these temporal parts 
"strung along in the manifold". 4 Thus, on this view, there is no movement 
through time because there is nothing that is at each of  two successive 
times. The individual is not at any one moment but rather is "at' an 
interval; and what is at a moment (namely a temporal part of  the individ- 
ual) is not at any other moment and so does not move from one moment 
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to another. Williams calls this theory of time "the theory of the manifold" 
because space and time are regarded (as in Relativity Theory) as forming a 
four-dimensional manifold. The point I wish to make here is the following. 
Since the theory of the manifold rejects any motion through time, it 
rejects the sort of motion involved in Wellsian time travel. But one need 
not accept the theory of the manifold in order to reject Wellsian time 
travel. One can reject Wellsian time travel on the grounds that it coun- 
tenances logical impossibilities (of the sort mentioned earlier) and yet 
allow movement in time. For instance, one could allow the alleged Time 
Traveller to move forward in time (from A to B in Figure 1) and still reject 
Wellsian time travel. So the rejection of Wellsian time travel does not 
commit one to the currently popular theory of the manifold. 
In this paper I do not intend to attack the interpretation of the Time 
Traveller case which is represented in Figure 1. My intention instead is to 
develop a model of time which will exhibit the logical possibility of 
Wellsian time travel and hence of interpreting the Time Traveller case 
in a Wellsian manner. The question with which I am dealing here is not 
whether we must interpret the case in a Wellsian manner, nor whether we 
should interpret the case that way, but instead whether we can interpret 
the case in that way. And by 'can' here, I mean without falling into logical 
inconsistency and yet taking account of all of the apparent facts of the 
case. The issue of what we must or should say is likely to depend on 
larger issues, such as the use to be made of the notions of illusion and 
reality in philosophy. For the interpretation represented in Figure 1 
would have us say, for example, that the person's apparent memories of 
the period C-D which he has while he is at A-B are in fact not memories 
at all and are illusory since they concern events which in fact happen to the 
person after he experiences the events in A-B. 
4. T H E  HARRISON OBJECTION 
Now let us turn to the second argument against WeUsian time travel that 
I wish to consider, one given by Jonathan Harrison. First, here is what I 
will call 'Harrison's Principle': "The sentence 'I [Harrison] was not at the 
Great Exhibition [of 1851]', if it can be used at one time to make a true 
statement, must make a true statement when it is used at any subsequent 
time". 5 The application of this principle to our case is this: if Wellsian 
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time travel (back to the Great  Exhibit ion o f  1851) takes place at 2 P M  on 
February  25, 1972 - that  is, if  the Time Traveller leaves at the latter 
time - then before that  moment  the use of  the sentence in question yields 
a true statement and after that  momen t  it yields a false statement. But 
this violates Harr ison 's  principle. Hence Wellsian time travel in such 
cases is not  possible. (It  should be noted that  Harr ison 's  Principle applies 
to sentences concerning unique events rather than, say, conditions or  
states o f  affairs.) 
Now,  we must  be careful about  just  what  it is that  Harr ison is t rying to 
show to be impossible. Consider the following passage f rom Harr ison:  
Perhaps travel to the past, though it is not now possible, may become so. Should it 
happen then its first manifestation will be the arrival of a time machine somewhere on 
the earth's surface at some time in the future. From the nature of the case, the appear- 
anee of the time machine must occur before the invention, construction and departure. 
Suppose such a machine does arrive at some time in the future, stays for a few days, 
and then goes. After this event, it will be true to say that certain men, perhaps men not 
yet born, have travelled to the past. Hence, if anyone after this event were to argue, as I 
have done, that time travel to the past was impossible, because this would mean al- 
tering the truth value of the proposition 'No past event, which can be described as the 
visit of a traveller in time, has taken place', his argument would fail, not because it is 
invalid, but because its premiss is untrue. 6 
The time travel described in this quota t ion  would not  violate Harr ison 's  
Principle for  the following reason. Let  us suppose that  in fact Harr ison 
was not  at the Great  Exhibition. Then, Harr i son  believes, it is and will 
always be, impossible for  him to travel back to the Exhibition. Fo r  other- 
wise Harr ison 's  Principle would be violated. But, he also believes, it is 
possible that  for  some future event E (future relative to our present now), 
a person who will be born  after E is nevertheless present at E. TbSs does 
not  violate Harr ison 's  Principle since the statement 'Tha t  person was at 
E '  will be true when made at any momen t  after E. The proposi t ion which 
this statement expresses never has one t ru th  value at one time and a 
different t ruth  value at another  time. I f  it is ever true that  this person was 
at E, then this is always true. 
So what  Harr ison believes to be impossible is that, given that  lie has 
never been to the Great  Exhibition, a time machine be invented which can 
take h im back to the Great  Exhibition. This is, o f  course, a very different 
objection f rom Williams'  objection and does not  claim, unlike Williams, 
that  WeUsian time travel p e r  se is impossible. Nevertheless, Harr ison 's  
objection does put  a fairly strict l imitation on Wellsian time travel. I th ink 
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that many of us who would like Wellsian time travel to be possible would 
prefer the possibility of just what Harrison claims to be impossible. I 
think that we would like it to be the case that up to a certain moment we 
had never been to the Great Exhibition and then (perhaps at the next 
moment) we are back there. And I want to suggest a model of time which 
allows this. 
5. T H E  P A S T  AS A C O N T I N U A N T  
The fundamental assumption behind Harrison's view is that the past is 
fixed and cannot change: If something E did happen at some moment ti in 
the past, then for every moment tj (where t~ is after ti) it is true at tj that E 
happened at t,. It is this assumption that prevents Harrison from going 
back to the Great Exhibition, given that he has never been there. I think 
that Harrison is right in saying that the proposition that it is impossible 
for him to go back to the Great Exhibition does not entail that Wellsian 
time travel is impossible. But, as we have seen, the assumption that the 
past is fixed and eternally changeless does make certain Wellsian trips to 
the past impossible. 
What happens if we give up the assumption that the past is fixed and is 
eternally changeless ? 
One thing that happens is that the past becomes capable of change. But 
change takes place over time. How are we to represent this conception of 
the past as something which can change over time? Consider the following 
diagram: 
Ptl Pt2 Pt~ Pt4 Pt5 PiG 
: ". . . / 
- 9 " . //t7 
A. .~ i  . 
P 7 '  
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Here we have a multi-dimensional theory of time - in particular, a two- 
dimensional theory - as compared with the usual one-dimensional theory 
which represents time along a straight line. The moments labelled t I to 
t7 on the diagonal line are present moments. The line P~-t~ (which we can 
call 'PI' for short) represents the past when t 1 is the present moment. 
That is, Px is the past at (or with respect to) the present moment tv 
Similarly, P2 is the past with respect to t 2. The dotted vertical lines in- 
dicate the positions of moments in the past. For example, the intersection 
ofP 3 with vertical line Pt~ is the position of the moment t~ in the past with 
respect to tv In this example, t3 is the present moment and the intersec- 
tion of the two lines just mentioned is the position of t~ when tl is past 
with respect to t 3. 
Now, the point of Figure 2 is that it gives a pictorial representation 
of the notion that each present moment has a potentially different past 
associated with it. Before discussing this notion further, let us see how 
this notion can be applied to Harrison's position. Remember that we have 
dropped the assumption that the past cannot change. Once we do this, the 
trips which Harrison claims to be impossible become possible (at least 
with regard to the considerations Harrison adduces). The only problem, 
in my opinion, with dropping Harrison's assumption that the past cannot 
change is that we have to make sense of the resulting notion of time. 
Harrison and others would doubtless object to dropping this assumption, 
on the grounds that (i) this assumption is essential to our notion of time; 
(ii) if this assumption is dropped, an unintelligible concept of time results. 
One thing that I hope to show in this paper is that the resulting concept of 
time, though perhaps not our usual concept, is one which is quite intelligi- 
ble. Moreover, it is a concept which may well represent time as it 'really' 
is. It is a concept which we may well want to adopt, replacing our usual 
concept of time with this new one. In my opinion, it is a large part of the 
task of metaphysicians to develop viable concepts (of time, personal 
identity, causality, and so on) which we might someday find useful to 
adopt. Given the concept of time which I will develop, we can deal with 
Harrison's trip to the Great Exhibition in the following way. Consider the 
present moment t 4 in Figure 2. P4 is the past associated with t,. Now, 
suppose that t 1 is the time of the Great Exhibition (1851, that is). So the 
point in Figure 2 labelled 'B' is the time of the Great Exhibition in t4's 
past. Suppose further that Harrison is not at B. But between t 4 and ts, 
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someone invents a time machine which Harrison enters at t 5 and travels 
to the Great Exhibition. If  time travel into the past takes no time (that is, 
is instantaneous), then Harrison will arrive at the point labelled 'A'. Thus, 
the proposition 'Harrison was not at the Great Exhibition' is true at t4 
and false at ts. In other words, our model of time allows propositions 
about the past to change their truth-value - because it allows the past to 
change. Trips which are impossible on Harrison's theory of time become 
possible on our multi-dimensional theory of time. 
I said above that according to our theory of time each present moment 
has a possibly different past associated with it. We must now further 
explain the notion of 'different' being used in saying this. One way of 
construing 'different' is as 'numerically different'. And if we were to 
construe 'different' in this way, we would be saying that there are many - 
indeed, an infinite number o f -  different pasts since there would be one 
for each present moment. This is not the way in which I am using 'different'. 
Instead I wish to construe 'different' as meaning 'qualitatively different'. 7 
I am saying that the past may be qualitatively different from one (present) 
moment to another. 
Earlier I suggested a defense of this theory of time in terms of the meta- 
physician's duty to construct alternative concepts from which we may 
select according to our needs and purposes. In saying this, however, I 
want to emphasize that the theory of time I am proposing is not completely 
different from our ordinary view. In fact, I claim that my theory embodies 
a significantpart of  our ordinary concept ofthepast. Far from being para- 
doxical, my theory is part of, or at least follows fairly directly from, our 
ordinary views of time. Briefly put, my position is that the past itself is a 
continuant. Being a continuant, the past exists at different times and there- 
fore can be different at one time from what it is at another time. And I 
claim that this view is a large part of our ordinary view about the past. 
We normally think of the past as a continuant, as existing at each of 
several times, as 'there' to be talked about at successive moments. So if 
there are any readers who feel that my theory is incredibly weird or 
completely adhoc or far removed from any reasonable conception of time, 
I would hope that they would pay special attention to what I have just 
said, since I think that this ought to induce a very sympathetic attitude 
toward my proposal. However, I am not defending my proposal on the 
grounds that it preserves and elaborates part of our ordinary conception 
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of the past. I think that the metaphysician performs his function properly 
even if he proposes a concept which is completely different from our 
ordinary concepts, as long as it is a concept which could be useful in 
apprehending and/or understanding the world. My remarks about our 
ordinary concept have two purposes: (i) the descriptive purpose of merely 
showing how my proposal relates to our ordinary concept; (ii) the rhetor- 
ical purpose of trying to persuade those philosophers who think that 
philosophy ought to stick to ordinary concepts to take a more sympathetic 
view of my proposal. 
I have said that it is one legitimate function of the metaphysician to 
invent alternative concepts which we might someday wish to employ. Now, 
having said this, I must acknowledge that it is reasonable that the meta- 
physician who engages in this (shall we call it, speculative) function should 
be required to state some possible circumstances in which we would be 
inclined to adopt the concept he is developing. It is reasonable to demand 
that he say something to show its possible utility. Naturally, one way in 
whJich I would try to fulfill this demand in the case of the concept of time 
that I am proposing is to say that if strange machines containing people 
in futuristic garments and speaking strange tongues (or perhaps using 
ESP instead of speech) were to appear and were to claim to be from the 
future, we might very well begin to search for a theory of time that allows 
their claim to be true. And my proposal would be one theory at least 
worth investigating, and perhaps adopting, to replace our old, linear, and 
one-dimensional theory of time. In other words, our old, linear view of 
time was developed to handle a rather limited set of phenomena. If new 
phenomena of the sort just described were to occur, we might well want 
to discard the old, limited concept and replace it with a more inclusive and 
flexible concept. This same kind of point has been made by many philos- 
ophers who have argued that conceptual truths are in fact empirical 
"though canonized by long usage and convenience [and, one should add, 
by the limited range of phenomena so far experienced] into definitions. ''s 
6. T H E  R E P L Y  TO THE W I L L I A M S  O B J E C T I O N  
Now let us see how the two-dimensional theory of time allows us to 
handle the Williams objection to Wellsian time travel. Suppose that the 
'rime Traveller starts at t~t - that is, he gets into his machine at t ,  and 
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throws the appropriate switches. Let us also suppose that he wishes to go 
one hundred years into the past, and let tl be one hundred years earlier 
than t4. Suppose, further, that this particular time machine requires five 
minutes to transport the Time Traveller one hundred years into the past. 
Let t5 be five minutes after t 4. G i v e n  these conditions we can locate the 
temporal position of the Time Traveller at his arrival in the past, namely 
the point 'A' on Figure 2. He is (at A) one hundred years in the past. But 
he is not one hundred years in the past at just any time. Instead he is one 
hundred years in the past relative to ts. The point I wish to make here is 
that on this conception of time, one has to specify two times when talking 
about time travel into the past (or into the future). First, one has to specify 
the past at a certain present. We have done this by specifying that we are 
talking about the past as it is at ts. Second, one has to specify the Travel- 
ler's location in the past at that present. And we do this by saying 'one 
hundred years from the time from which he started' (in this case, t4). 
Since two temporal specifications are needed, the statement which 
Williams derided, namely 'Five minutes from now, he will be one hundred 
years from now', makes perfectly good sense. Five minutes from t4, the 
Time Traveller will be one hundred years from now in ts's past. To put 
this another way, the distance he will travel into the past is given by the 
distance between t4 (which is 'now') and tl (which is one hundred years 
from t4); the time that it takes him to travel this temporal distance is 
given by the distance between t4 and t5 (namely five minutes). Thus, 
Williams' alleged impossibility dissolves. 
7. D O E S  TIME TRAVEL TAKE TIME?  
I have told the story in the previous section in such a way that the trip into 
the past took time to complete. In particular, it took five minutes to go 
back one hundred years. I did this in order to fit the case to Williams' 
example of a supposed impossibility. Somebody may now pose the follow- 
ing objection: "You can make sense out of a Williams-type statement 
(that is, a statement which mentions two times as above) only if time 
travel takes time; if time travel is instantaneous, then Williams is still 
right." 
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Fig. 3. 
Let t~ and t2 in Figure 3 be one year apart, and similarly for the distances 
between the other neighboring moments. Our Time Traveller leaves at t4 
in order to go three years into the past (that is, back to t~). Assuming that 
time travel is instantaneous, he will arrive at the position 'C' in Fignre 3. 
(That is, he will arrive at t 1 in t4's past). Let us now assume that he stays 
in the past at that same position relative to the passing years for at least 
four years. Then his temporal locations during this interval lie on the 
dotted diagonal line in Figure 3. That is, he successively occupies positions 
D, E, F, and G. At D, he is three years from the present moment ts; at E, 
he is three years from t6; and so on. In other words, the dotted diagonal 
line represents the situation of the traveller who goes back to a certain 
point in the past and then lives through past events at the normal rate 
from that point on. Now, we can make not only meaningful but also true 
Williams-type statements about this traveller. For instance, at t 4 (as the 
present moment) we can say 'One year from now, he will be two years 
from now'. This is a true statement for the following reason: 'now' is 
taken to refer, in both occurrences, to t4; one year from t~ (that is, one 
year after the traveller begins his trip), the traveller will be at position D; 
to be at position D is to be at t z in ts's past; but t2 is two years away from 
t4, just as the Williams-type statement asserts; hence the statement is true. 
Thus, the objection is not sound. We can make sense of Williams-type 
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statements independently of whether time travel does or does nol take time. 
8. T H E  R E L A T I V I T Y  OF PAST, PRESENT,  AND F U T U R E  
In my latest story, the Time Traveller stays in the past for a while. He 
lives through past events at the same rate as his then contemporaries, for 
example, a man we might call 'Tom' who likewise occupies positions C 
through G but who has never engaged in time travel. Tom obviously 
believes that he himself is living in the present and would regard the Time 
Traveller as arriving from the future. On the other hand, the Time 
Traveller regards himself as living in the past and as having arrived from 
the present. So the question arises: are Tom and the Time Traveller now 
living in the present or in the past? 
One line of thought on this problem would demand that the answer to 
this question be the same for both persons. That is to say, it would demand 
that if we were to say that Tom is living in the present, we would then 
have to say that the Time Traveller is living in the present too. I think that 
there are sufficient differences between their situations, though, that we 
should say that Tom is living in the present while the Time Traveller is 
living in the past, even though they co-exist at one and the same moment. 
The salient difference between them is simply the fact that Tom has never 
engaged in time travel. This may seem like begging the question. For by 
saying that Tom has never engaged in time travel, I may seem to be 
saying that Tom has never gone to the past; and this already assumes that 
he is always in the present, So to say that Tom has never engaged in time 
travel is to say the same thing as that he is in the present and not to 
provide a ground for saying the latter. Nevertheless, there is a vital 
difference in their situations which we can represent on our two-dimen- 
sional time charts: Tom's time line is straight, while the Time Traveller's 
is bent. But is this any more than another begging of the question? Can 
we describe the differences in their situations without assuming what we 
want to establish? I think there is no begging of the question here. By 
saying that the Time Traveller's time line is bent, we are only saying that 
moments are arranged consecutively and that the Time Traveller does not 
live through consecutive moments at some points in his history. In 
particular, the Time Traveller lives through such moments as t3 twice 
(one time as the present and the next time as the past). I think that this 
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fact is describable independently of the notions of past and present and 
can therefore be used as the ground for the claim that Tom is living in the 
present while the Time Traveller is living in the past. 
But now, even more serious troubles confront us. I f  Tom is living in the 
present, then why isn't his time line coincident with the main diagonal line 
in Figure 3 ? After all, it is this main diagonal line which represents the 
present. In fact, the impression given by the two-dimensional diagrams I 
am using is that there is something like an Absolute Present - represented 
by this main diagonal. And Tom should certainly be living along this 
main diagonal, for he is living in the present. 
Let us begin by pointing out a few features of our diagrams. First, while 
the expression 'the Absolute Present' may have several different meanings, 
there is one central meaning of that expression as follows: a moment is a 
member of the Absolute Present if and only if that moment is always 
present and never past or future. Now, in this sense of that expression, 
there is no Absolute Present represented in our diagrams. For every 
moment that lies along the main diagonal will also lie on the P1-P~ past 
lines. To give a concrete example, t 4 is a present moment on the main 
diagonal and is also a past moment as represented by the points along line 
Pt 4. But if the main diagonal in Figure 3 does not represent the Absolute 
Present, then what does it represent? Clearly what it represents is the 
Time Traveller" s present. If  we made a diagram to represent Tom's present, 
the Time Traveller would be represented as coming from the future (that 
is, from points to the right of the main diagonal). 
So our diagrams are made from a particular person's point of view - in 
the cases of Figures 2 and 3, from the Time Traveller's point of view. 
Moreover, I have been talking about this or that person's present (or past). 
Thus, what I am doing is relativizing the terms 'present', 'past', and 
'future' to persons. The ultimate consequence of this view is that there is 
no such thing as The Present or The Past. There is only His Present or 
Hfs Past. This view - the relativization of past, present, and future to 
persons - enables us to avoid a certain objection. If  we said that Tom was 
living in the present while the Time Traveller was living in this past, then 
it follows that one and the same moment is both past and present (since 
Tom and the Time Traveller exist at the same moments when the Time 
Traveller is on his trip). And it would be objected that 'past' and 'present' 
are mutually exclusive adjectives such that if one applies to a certain 
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moment, the other cannot apply. In fact, this point - namely the mutually 
exclusive character of past and present - was the basis of McTaggart's 
famous proof that time is unreal. McTaggart tried to show (among other 
things) that our concept of time is such that both (i) a single moment 
could not be both past and present, and (ii) single moments had to be both 
past and present, thus resulting in a contradiction and hence in the unreality 
of time. However, my view that past and present are relativized notions 
escapes all such objections. For there is no contradiction in one and the 
same moment being past to one person and present to another. 
This technique of relativizing past, present, and future can also be used 
to answer more complex questions about time travel, questions that are 
practically invited by my two-dimensional diagrams and to which we 
must be able to give reasonable answers. As an example of such questions, 
consider the following complex time trip: the Time Traveller starts from 
t ,  and goes back to tl (position C); he then continues to live through time 
at the normal rate along the dotted diagonal until he reaches position E; 
at E he decides to get back into his time machine and go forward to ts. 
The question is this: in his trip to ts, will he arrive at t s on the main 
diagonal (t5 as one of his present moments), will he instead arrive at 
position S (which is ts in t6's past, that is, ts of the past he is already in), 
or will he perhaps arrive at position Y which is t5 in t3's future (this being 
a possibility because he is starting from E which is t3 as a past moment)? 
This same question can be put by asking whether the Time Traveller will 
arrive at a past moment (S), a present moment (ts), or a future moment 
(y) .9  
One point to notice about this trip is that it is not clear what the starting 
point of the Time Traveller's trip to ts is. Is the starting point t ,  (the start 
of his travels) or is it instead E (ta as past) which is the start of the latest 
leg of his journey? In any case, one is tempted to say that since his latest 
destination (ts) is after both of these potential starting-points, he is 
travelling to a future moment with respect to these starting-points. There is 
a complicating factor, though, which should prevent us from accepting 
this relativized solution too readily. The complication is that when the 
Time Traveller is at E and begins his new journey to ts, he is also - in some 
sense of ' a t '  - at t6. For E is in tG'S past. And to be in t~'s past is in some 
way to be at t ,  a way in which one is not at some other present moment. 
Now, t5 is past with respect to t6. So there is a respect in which ts is a past 
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moment and in which the Time Traveller, in travelling to ts, travels to a 
past moment (rather than a future moment as suggested above). That is, 
he is staying in the past during this trip. 
So it all depends on what we take as our reference point. Our reference 
point will determine whether the Time Traveller's destination is past, 
present, or future. I am not ruling out the possibility of cases in which we 
choose a reference point and still don't know what to call the destination. 
In fact, we may have one of these indeterminate cases here; if we choose E 
as the reference point for the trip to ts, we are in the following quandary: 
E as t3 is past with respect to ts, but E as a moment in t6's past is future 
to t5 since t6 is future to ts. Nevertheless, there will be cases in which choice 
of a reference point answers the question. For example, if our reference 
point is it, then the Time Traveller's destination is past; for all of the 
possibilities - S, ts, and Y - are past with respect to tt. This latter result 
agrees with what any follower of Wells would say, too; from the stand- 
point of the people at t6, the Time Traveller is still merely junketing 
around in the past (that is, their past). 
9. C O M P O U N D  T E M P O R A L  D E S I G N A T I O N S  
At this point it may be convenient to point out that we can use compound 
temporal designations to talk about the two-dimensional model of time. 
By 'simple temporal designations' here, I mean the terms 'past', 'present', 
and 'future'. These are the terms we use in connection with the old, one- 
dimensional model. Now, consider Figure 3 again, and in particular, 
suppose that we are at t 5 (that is, we are taking t 5 as the present moment). 
Horizontal line P3 represents ta's past. But t3 is itself past when t5 is 
present. So, with respect to ts, line P3 represents a past past. This dis- 
tinguishes P3 from Ps; for Ps, being the present's past, is a present past. 
Similarly, we have future pasts, present futures, future futures, and so on, 
on this two-dimensional model. 
10. T H E  F I X E D  A N D  U N C H A N G I N G  C H A R A C T E R  OF T H E  P A S T  
ON T H E  T W O - D I M E N S I O N A L  T H E O R Y  OF T I M E  
Earlier, in Section 5, I showed that my theory of time is not totally at 
odds with our usual conception of time. I showed that the notion of the 
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past as a continuant is part of our ordinary conception and that this 
notion forms the backbone of my theory. And I said this partly in an 
effort to make readers more sympathetic to my theory. I said this partly 
to make my theory seem less weird and incredible to readers who have 
grown up with the ordinary, one-dimensional theory. But now, the 
therapeutic value of Section 5 has probably worn off, especially after my 
talk about past pasts and future futures. My theory is probably coming to 
seem very weird again to many readers. So I believe it important at this 
point to exhibit another way in which my theory preserves something very 
close to one of our ordinary beliefs about time and the past. Hopefully, 
this will renew the reader's sympathetic attitude toward this theory, as 
well as shed further light on the theory itself. 
In our ordinary notion of time, most of us think of events as happening 
at a present moment and then rolling off down the time line to be stored 
'eternally' - fixed and unchanging - in the warehouse of the past. It is this 
view, as I said earlier, that is expressed in Harrison's Principle. I have said 
that my two-dimensional model dispenses with this idea and that dis- 
pensing with this is what makes Wellsian time travel possible to any point 
in the past. Now, it may seem to many people that to dispense with this 
idea is to pay too high a price for the possibility of Wellsian time travel. 
These people may simply balk at this, though I am not sure how they 
would justify balking (except by appeal to an old model of time whose 
main virtue is that they have been using it since they were children). That 
events are eternally fixed and unchanging in the past may be taken by 
people to be a touchstone of adequacy for any model of time and as some- 
thing not to be argued but instead assumed. In view of the likelihood of 
this attitude, I think that it is important to point out that the two- 
dimensional model allows for the fixity and unchanging quality of past 
events. On the two-dimensional model, if an event exists at some past 
temporal location, then it always - fixedly and eternally and unchangingly 
- exists at that past temporal location. What I have just said in the pre- 
vious sentence sounds, of course, very much like Harrison's Principle. 
And so it sounds as if in saying this, I am accepting the unchanging quality 
of past events and yet denying Harrison's Principle (see Section 5 where I 
abandon this Principle) and therefore contradicting myself. But in fact I 
can insist on the fixity of past events and at the same time deny Harrison's 
Principle without inconsistency. I can do this because I stipulate that the 
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past events be temporally located or specified by the use of two temporal 
coordinates, not just one coordinate as in the old straight-line model of  
time. The temporal specification of  past events on my model requires the 
use of  two coordinates because we need to know at what present time they 
are past. Nevertheless, it must be stressed that once the two temporal 
coordinates are given, a fixed, unchanging past event has been spe- 
cified. 
In the one-dimensional model, we locate events temporally by using 
coordinates of the form ' t / .  In the two-dimensional model we use coordi- 
nates of  the form ' tx-ty',  where tx indicates the past moment and ty 
indicates the present moment. Thus, the temporal specification of  some 
event E might be t l - t  4, where this means that the event E is located at the 
moment tl in t4's past. 1~ Now, let us see how the parallel to Harrison's 
view works. Harrison says that if the Time Traveller has not already been 
to t~, he cannot get there by time machine; to get there, he must have 
always been there. On our view, he can be absent from t~ on some of  the 
Pt horizontal lines and yet be at t~ on others of these lines. Yet, the parallel 
holds: if  the Traveller is not already at tx-ty, he cannot get there by time 
machine on our model, tl 
Now I am not saying that this parallel must hold, that anyone who 
thinks about time two-dimensionally in this way must agree that if the 
Traveller is not already at tx-ty, he cannot get there. The consequences of 
not agreeing to this and yet still using the two-dimensional model must 
be worked out. Perhaps working it out will require higher orders of  
dimensionality and force a shift from a two-dimensional model to a three- 
or an n-dimensional model. All I want to claim now is that the parallel can 
hold within the two-dimensional model and that this brings our model 
closer to the ordinary view of time. But it must not be overlooked that 
our model represents a positive gain over the ordinary view. For  on our 
model the Time Traveller can go back to the Great Exhibition of  1851 
even though he was not there previously to the time at which he begins his 
journey. If  he leaves in 1972, he can get back to 1851 even though it was 
true in 1971 that he was not at 1851. This is what Harrison denies and 
what our view affirms. But we can (though perhaps not 'must') admit that 
if it is not true in 1971 that the Time Traveller is already at the temporal 
location '1851-1972', then he cannot leave 1972 to go back to 1851. So I 
am admitting that although I have removed Harrison's restrictions on 
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possible time trips, my own model of time may contain analogous (though 
clearly more liberal) restrictions on such trips. 
11. CHANGES IN THE PAST 
This model of time, which treats the past as a continuant, clearly allows 
the past to change. The possibility of Wellsian time travel and the possibil- 
ity of the past changing are two different topics. But these two topics are 
closely related, as I hope to show in this section. 
As an example of a change i~ the past, we might use this: at present 
moment t4, moment tl  is in the past; at tl Jones reached into his pocket 
and drew out a quarter to buy a newspaper; we may suppose that in the 
past as it is at t4, Jones has two quarters in his pocket and drew out the 
first of these; now, the change in question takes place with respect to t~ 
between moments t4 and t5 : at t4, Jones had drawn out the first quarter at 
t~, whereas at t5, Jones had drawn out the second quarter instead. 12 
Some people believe that changes in the past cannot occur, that all 
changes must occur in the present. Miss Anscombe, in support of the view 
that changes in the past are impossible, argues that any change must be 
datable and that changes in the past are not datable, lz But we can see that 
our model of time allows the dating of such changes and hence, as far as 
the Anscombe argument is concerned, allows changes in the past. For 
example, the date of the change from one quarter to another in the Jones 
example is t s - or, perhaps, the interval between t4 and t 5. That is when 
the change happens. Of course, the expression 'when the change happens' 
is ambiguous. It could be used to refer to the past moment - that is, to the 
temporal location of the difference in states of affairs which constitutes the 
change (in our example, tl) - or it could be used to refer to the date of the 
change (the interval t ,  to ts). Our model of time makes this distinction 
possible. If  we thought of time as one-dimensional - as laid out on a line - 
instead of two-dimensional, we could not make this distinction, and the 
Anscombe objection would hold good. In fact, on the one-dimensional 
model we would run into all sorts of contradictions (reminiscent, again, 
of McTaggart's arguments against the reality of time). Such contradictions 
are, no doubt, the ultimate thrust of Miss Anscombe's objection, though 
she does not put it in this way. An example of such a contradiction would 
run as follows: the putative change in the past occurs at t l ;  t~ must be a 
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past moment in order for this to be a change in the past; but all changes 
must occur in the present (that is, they must be 'at' a present moment 
when they occur); so tl must be a present moment when the change occurs; 
but it follows from this that tl must be (simultaneously, as it were) both 
past and present; but (on the linear, or one-dimensional, model which we 
are presupposing) this is contradictory; in fact, on that model 'being past' 
partly means 'not being present'. It is clear that our two-dimensional 
model avoids these contradictions, as well as the Anscombe objection. 
But, equally important, there is a truth in the Anscombe position and 
this truth is preserved by our model. The Anscombe position invokes the 
principle that the date of every change is the date of the present moment 
when the change occurs. This is preserved by our model because the date 
of the change in the Jones example is not t~ (the past moment) but instead 
t4 to t5; and & to ts indicates the present moment when the change occurs. 
tl is not the date of the change but instead only the temporal location of 
the change. Thus, on the two-dimensional model there are two ways in 
which a change can be at a time, and these must be kept very distinct from 
one another. But I do want to emphasize that much more must be said 
about the way in which a past event or state of affairs is at a present 
moment. In what manner does the past now exist? Is this perhaps a 
totally misleading way of looking at the past? These are examples of the 
fundamental sorts &questions which examination of the two-dimensional 
model may help to answer. 
It may be asked: what could cause a change in the past? One answer 
would be: a time traveller. If the Time Traveller is not in the past with 
respect to t4 and arrives in the past with respect to ts, then the past at t,~ is 
different from the past at ts. A change in the past has taken place at the 
date t4 to ts and at the temporal location which is the terminus of the Time 
Traveller's journey into the past. What I am saying here is that the Travel- 
ler's arrival in the past constitutes in itself a change in the past. 
12. O T H E R  OBJECTIONS TO W E L L S I A N  TIME TRAVEL 
AND THE REPLY TO THEM 
I want to finish with a brief statement about a series of objections which 
have been raised to time travel. These objections all have the same cMrac- 
ter, namely attempting to show that the Time Traveller could cause events 
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to happen  where this would lead to paradoxes and even to logical con- 
tradictions.  One example will serve to s tand for the rest: a time traveller 
returns to the t ime of his youth  and  accidentally murders  his younger  self. 
Such cases are usually offered as objections to the possibility of t ime 
travel. My  own view is that  they show noth ing  about  the possibility of  
t ime travel. Wha t  they show, if anything,  is the impossibil i ty of certain 
sorts of events happening  in  the past. t4 For  example, the case just  men- 
t ioned shows, i f  anything,  that  it  is impossible for this traveller to murder  
his younger  self. 15 Such cases exhibit restrictions on  the traveller 's 
activities bu t  have no  implications concerning Wellsian time travel 
itself. 
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